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Most of the time, when some data must be encrypted, it must also be protected with a, because encryption protects only against passive attackers. There are some nifty encryption modes which include a MAC (.) but let's assume that we are doing old-style crypto, so we have a standalone encryption method (e.g. AES with CBC chaining and PKCS#5 padding) and a standalone MAC (e.g. With SHA-256).

How should we assemble the encryption and the MAC?. MAC-then-Encrypt: Compute the MAC on the cleartext, append it to the data, and then encrypt the whole? (That's what does). Encrypt-and-MAC: Compute the MAC on the cleartext, encrypt the cleartext, and then append the MAC at the end of the ciphertext? (That's what SSH does). Encrypt-then-MAC: Encrypt the cleartext, then compute the MAC on the ciphertext, and append it to the ciphertext?

(In that case, we do not forget to include the initialization vector (IV) and the encryption method identifier into the MACed data.)The first two options are often called 'MAC-then-encrypt' while the third is 'encrypt-then-MAC'. What are the arguments for or against either? I'm assuming you actually know all of this better than I do. Anyway, neatly summarizes all these approaches, and what level of security they do or don't provide. I shall paraphrase it in English, rather than Mathematical notation, as I understand it.Encrypt-then-MAC:.

Provides integrity of Ciphertext. Assuming the MAC shared secret has not been compromised, we ought to be able to deduce whether a given ciphertext is indeed authentic or has been forged; for example, in public-key cryptography anyone can send you messages. EtM ensures you only read valid messages.

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She gives one of them away to wealthy Mrs Lyons and they grow up as friends in ignorance of their fraternity until the inevitable quarrel unleashes a blood-bath.'

Plaintext integrity. If the cipher scheme is we need not be so concerned since the MAC will filter out this invalid ciphertext.

The MAC does not provide any information on the plaintext since, assuming the output of the cipher appears random, so does the MAC. In other words, we haven't carried any structure from the plaintext into the MAC.MAC-then-Encrypt:. Does not provide any integrity on the ciphertext, since we have no way of knowing until we decrypt the message whether it was indeed authentic or spoofed. Plaintext integrity. If the cipher scheme is it may be possible to alter the message to appear valid and have a valid MAC.

This is a theoretical point, of course, since practically speaking the MAC secret should provide protection. Here, the MAC cannot provide any information on the plaintext either, since it is encrypted.Encrypt-and-MAC:. No integrity on the ciphertext again, since the MAC is taken against the plaintext. This opens the door to some chosen-ciphertext attacks on the cipher, as shown in section 4 of.

The integrity of the plaintext can be verified. If the cipher scheme is malleable, the contents of the ciphertext could well be altered, but on decryption, we ought to find the plaintext is invalid.

Of course, any implementation error that can be exploited in the decryption process has been by that point. May reveal information about the plaintext in the MAC.

Theoretical, of course, but a less than ideal scenario. This occurs if the plaintext messages are repeated, and the MACed data does not include a counter (it does in the SSH 2 protocol, but only as a 32-bit counter, so you should take care to re-key before it overflows).In short, Encrypt-then-MAC is the most ideal scenario. Any modifications to the ciphertext that do not also have a valid MAC can be filtered out before decryption, protecting against any attacks on the implementation. The MAC cannot, also, be used to infer anything about the plaintext.

MAC-then-Encrypt and Encrypt-and-MAC both provide different levels of security, but not the complete set provided by Encrypt-then-MAC. @Ninefingers answers the question quite well; I just want to add a few details.Encrypt-then-MAC is the mode which is recommended by most researchers. Mostly, it makes it easier to prove the security of the encryption part (because thanks to the MAC, a decryption engine cannot be fed with invalid ciphertexts; this yields automatic protection against chosen ciphertext attacks) and also avoids any trouble to confidentiality from the MAC (since the MAC operates on the encrypted text, it cannot reveal anything about the plaintext, regardless of its quality).

Note that the, which have been applied in the field to ASP.NET, are chosen ciphertext attacks.Ferguson and Schneier, in their book, have argued the opposite: that MAC-then-encrypt (or MAC-and-encrypt) is the 'natural' order and that encrypt-then-MAC is overly complex. The sore point of encrypt-then-MAC is that you have to be careful about what you MAC: you must not forget the initialization vector, or (in case the protocol allows algorithm flexibility) the unambiguous identifier for the encryption algorithm; otherwise, the attacker could change either, inducing a plaintext alteration which would be undetected by the MAC. To prove their point, Ferguson and Schneier describe an attack over an instance of IPsec in which the encrypt-then-MAC was not done properly.So while encrypt-then-MAC is theoretically better, it is also somewhat harder to get right. $begingroup$ This list is not exhaustive though, there are cipher modes that provide authenticated encryption, i.e. With no need for a separate hash algorittm (e.g. I came up with several own schemes but this is still early experimentation. One of them e.g.

Is called multi-pass CBC (which cyclically applies CBC several times between standard cipher rounds), which appears to resist not only attacks on same-key CBC-MAC but also padding oracle attacks, but is impractical for large messages. It will be a while before (and if) I publish. $endgroup$–Jun 20 '19 at 14:56. Although there are already many answers here, I wanted to strongly advocate AGAINST MAC-then-encrypt.

I fully agree with Thomas' first half of the answer, but completely disagree with the second half. The ciphertext is the ENTIRE ciphertext (including IV etc.), and this is what must be MACed. This is granted.However, if you MAC-then-encrypt in the straightforward way, then you are completely vulnerable to padding-oracle attacks. By the 'straightforward way', what I mean is that you call the 'decrypt' function, and afterwards the 'mac verify'. However, if you get an error in the decrypt function, then you return this straight away, as a padding error. You have now just got a full blown padding oracle attack and you are dead.

You can now hack the API and give a single error message only, but the time it takes to return the error has to be the same, whether it's a MAC error or a padding error. If you think that this is easy, then look at the Lucky13 attack on SSL. It's really really really hard (and much harder than just MACing all of the ciphertext).The argument by Schneier and Ferguson for MAC-then-encrypt has no formal basis at all. The definition of authenticated-encryption is met by encrypt-then-MAC and is NOT met by MAC-then-encrypt. Furthermore, most implementations of MAC-then-encrypt are actually completely vulnerable to padding oracle attacks and so are actually broken in practice. Don't do this!Having said all of the above, my recommendation is to not use any of this. You should be using GCM or CCM today (GCM is much faster, so use it as long as you are sure that your IV won't repeat).

A combined authenticated-encryption scheme, with a single API call, and now you won't get in trouble.